CSC107 - Lab 5
Population and Evolution
Assigned Apr 5th
Due Apr 12th 5 pm
Show your work on all questions for full credit.
References
Question 1
Alter the Wolves, Sheep, Grass simulation so that the reproduction is not based on
random probability, but on how much energy the wolves and sheep have. If a sheep
has energy over a certain threshold, defined by a new slider, the sheep will
reproduce, and similarly for wolves.
Write the changed procedures, and discuss the differences between this new model and the original model.
Similarly, alter the grass reproduction to proceed in a manner similar to forest
fires spreading. If a patch is green, then 25% of the time have it find one
brown NSEW neighbor and ask this neighbor patch to turn green.
Write the changed procedures, and discuss the differences between this new model and the original model.
Question 2
Find the optimal choice for both player A and B in the following games. Is there an
equilibrium point where both players are happy?
Question 3
Using the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma webpage above, calculate the scores for
the following competitions:
- Pavlov vs Suspicious Tit for Tat
- Always Defect vs Gradual
- Remorseful Prober vs Grudger
Question 4
Create a custom strategy of your own, by selecting the values for T, P, R, S and B.
Write down your values for this strategy.
Calculate your score versus the following strategies:
- Always Cooperate
- Tit for Tat
- Pavlov
Question 5
We initialize a population with 12 individuals to play the Prisoner's
Dilemma, 4 playing the Tit for Tat strategy,
4 playing Always Defect, and 4 playing Always Cooperate. After the first
round of competition with random pairings and 10 games, we find that on
average Tit for Tat scored 20 points, Always Defect scored 30 points, and
Always Cooperate scored 10 points.
According to the Replicator Dynamics, what should the population look like next
iteration?
© Mark Goadrich 2010, Centenary College of Louisiana