CSC107 - Lab 16
Evolutionary Game Theory

Show your work on all questions for full credit.

References

Question 1

Find the optimal choice for both player A and B in the following games by drawing the game tree. Is there an equilibrium point where both players are happy?

B

A 3, 4 2, 3

4, 2 5, 5

B

A 3, 4 1, 1

0, 2 1, 2

Question 2

Using the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma webpage above, calculate the scores for the following competitions:

Pavlov vs Suspicious Tit for Tat
Always Defect vs Gradual
Remorseful Prober vs Grudger

Use the standard settings of 5% Random Intervention and 100 Simulation Rounds.

Question 3

Create a custom strategy of your own, by selecting the values for T, P, R, S and B. Write down your values for this strategy. Calculate your score versus the following strategies:

Always Cooperate
Tit for Tat
Pavlov

Question 4

We initialize a population with 12 individuals to play the Prisoner's Dilemma, 4 playing the Tit for Tat strategy, 4 playing Always Defect, and 4 playing Always Cooperate. After the first round of competition with random pairings and 10 games, we find that on average Tit for Tat scored 20 points, Always Defect scored 30 points, and Always Cooperate scored 10 points.